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Scottish ferry policy 
and the Commission 
decision 
 
 
Professor Neil Kay, Department of Economics, University of 
Strathclyde 
 
 
This article is an update of an earlier review of Scottish ferry 
policy in this Commentary last year 
1 
(hence “Fraser 
Commentary Feb 09”) in the light of the outcome of the 
European Commission investigation into alleged State aid 
for Scottish ferries. The European Commission announced 
their investigation
2 
 into alleged State aid for Scottish ferry 
services in May 2008 (hence “EC May 08”) and their final 
Decision
3 
 was published October 2009 (hence EC Oct 09).  
  
This update is intended to be read in conjunction with Fraser 
Commentary Feb 09 to minimise repetition of facts and 
arguments set out in that earlier article.   
 
 
The main conclusion here is that successive Scottish 
administrations have adopted what might be described an 
ostrich approach to ferry policy, burying their heads in the 
sand and hoping that nothing nasty will happen
4
, and that 
EC Oct 09 has done nothing to rectify this state of affairs.  
The context is set by arguments I made as far back as 2001 
in evidence to the first Parliamentary Inquiry into the 
tendering of CalMac, that it was well established and 
accepted practice (as demonstrated in the case of the UK) 
that in an industry characterized by the provision of an 
essential services, three essential tools were needed: (a) an 
independent regulator; (b) a clearly defined Operator of Last 
Resort able to take over the contract immediately should the 
incumbent withdraw, or if withdrawal is threatened; (c) a well 
developed supporting statutory framework. As I noted in 
Fraser Feb 09, had the problem been properly defined, then 
policy makers would have been more likely to have antici-
pated and dealt with public interest issues that have arisen 
and may well arise in the future. These problems were 
compounded by other failures in terms of interpretation of 
EC law which limited what policymakers could and should 
have done.   
  
These failures have numerous ramifications and we shall 
concentrate briefly on just six issues of concern as indicative 
of possible problems, or as major problems in their own 
right.   
 
1.  Altmark and the need to tender 
EC Oct 09 confirms (para 165) that “in order to establish 
that there is an advantage capable of constituting State aid 
in the sense of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, the Commission 
must assess whether the Altmark conditions are fulfilled”.  
The crucial point about this, as noted in Fraser Feb 09, is 
that I and two other academics had produced papers 
independently of each other which argued that there was 
actually no need under EC law to expose the CalMac 
network to the considerable and recurring delays and costs 
that a six-yearly tendering process would involve. As Fraser 
Feb 09 notes, I had pointed out that a coherent alternative 
to tendering could be fashioned consistent with EC law if the 
Altmark conditions were fulfilled. But as Fraser Feb 09 also 
notes, the then Scottish Executive rejected these arguments 
in 2005 claiming instead that the Altmark criteria were not 
applicable to such ferry services.  
 
It is small comfort to note that we were right and the 
government’s legal advisers were wrong, because the result 
has been that the tender process did go ahead, and it is 
almost certain that such services will continue to be put out 
to tender. It is not that tendering is necessarily bad, indeed 
in many contexts it can be in the public interest, but as we 
shall see below, the failures by the government to accept 
the relevance of Altmark and alternatives to tendering when 
combined with other failures noted above raise real dangers 
and risks for the public interest here.  
 
For the alternatives to tendering cited by us to be revisited 
at official level would require officials admitting error; would 
require them to be able and willing to fashion coherent 
alternatives to tendering under the Altmark conditions; and 
would require the European Commission to accept radically 
new proposals fashioned by the same sources that have 
just been investigated by them for alleged breaches of EC 
law.   
 
All things considered, there may be thought to be little 
likelihood of such a reversal of policy taking place. The 
public interest would at least be served by a serious 
investigation as to why these failures took place, though that 
may also be unlikely to happen.  
 
2.  Public service obligations and Altmark in 
Scottish ferry services  
As discussed in Fraser Feb 09, public service obligations 
(PSOs) have a clearly defined role and status in EC law. 
The imposition of PSOs is stated by the Commission as a 
precondition for any subsidy for EC ferry services. Yet as 
noted in Fraser Feb 09, the government echoed its 
predecessor in rejecting arguments that there was a need 
for PSOs for any of its subsidised ferry services.   
 
This was at least folly, because it would have been possible 
to state that the public service contracts (PSCs) contained 
and helped deliver the requisite PSOs here. They chose not 
to adopt that solution but to reject PSOs just as the 
relevance of the Altmark principles had been rejected.  
 
It was therefore not surprising, indeed almost inevitable, that 
when the Commission made their announcement  of 
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Figure 1:  Caledonian MacBrayne ferry routes 
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intention to investigate these services for supposed breaches 
of State aid legislation, that suspected failure to apply clearly 
specified and justified PSOs and adhere to the Altmark 
principles figured repeatedly in the EC May 08 charge sheet. 
Yet EC Oct 09 subsequently found that the government and 
CalMac were largely innocent of these charges.     
 
If the Commission had found the charges as set out in EC 
May 08 justified, then in principle it could have led to the 
bankruptcy of CalMac: The government’s opinion as reported 
prior to EC May 08 was that “If found guilty the commission 
could request that CalMac, which is wholly owned by 
ministers and does not have large reserves of money, could 
be forced to repay subsidy which would potentially bankrupt 
the company and could leave our most fragile peripheral 
communities with no links to the mainland - or other island 
communities.”
5 
 
 It is worth noting that the dangers were of government’s own 
making, not only by creating what was seen by the 
Commission as prima facie cases of breaches of EC law, but 
also for failing to put in place the safeguards (such as 
Operator of Last Resort) that would guarantee the smooth 
continuance of these lifeline services to these same 
vulnerable communities in the event that the incumbent 
operator was unwilling or unable to continue.  
 
This was an occasion when weakness (on the part of the 
government) was strength. As I noted at the time
6
 with 
respect to the potential bankruptcy of CalMac for failing to 
adhere to EC law, I doubted whether that would be allowed 
to happen, and so it has proved.  The government of the time 
and its predecessors had put the Commission into an 
impossible situation where the stark choice was between 
finding (as charged) that the government had failed to have 
clearly specified and justified PSOs and adherence to the 
Altmark principles, in which case the remedy could lead to 
the collapse of an entire transportation network providing 
essential services to vulnerable communities; or the 
Commission could conclude (as they did) that despite having 
rejected PSOs and the Altmark principles, the government 
somehow did indeed have properly constituted PSOs across 
the board and had also adhered to these same Altmark 
principles.  
 
If the first scenario facing the Commission could have come 
out of a disaster movie, the second had more the taste of 
Alice in Wonderland.  
 
Given these two choices, the EC Oct 09 Decision was 
undoubtedly the right one in terms of the public interest, as I 
had noted prior to EC May 08; “Were Brussels to close down 
the ferry services, the outrage would not only be felt in 
Scotland, but across Europe,”
7
    
 
The problem is that while the Decision was the right one in 
terms of the alternatives, it does not provide a solution to the 
problems that policy makers have created here, and we turn 
to some of these now.       
 
3.   Cherry picking  
The most obvious opportunities for cherry picking in ferry 
services depend on the nature and characteristics of the 
route in question, but (just as in postal services) will typically 
target high value and/or low cost services. In an unregulated 
ferry market this is likely to be cars and commercial vehicles, 
freight, short crossings, seasonal traffic, and/or highly 
trafficked routes. The corollary holds; cherry pickers are less 
likely to be interested in off-season, foot passenger, longer 
crossing, and/or lightly trafficked routes.  
 
Cherry picking is not automatically against the public interest 
especially if there can be competition amongst cherry pickers 
within a given market (as in some cases of postal services). 
However, in the ferry markets served by CalMac, the 
likelihood of competition between cherry pickers for particular 
services on a given route is likely to be small and if cherry 
picking takes place on a given route it is likely to lead to a 
local monopoly. There is little if any evidence that such 
markets are likely to be contestable in practice, especially 
since there may be incumbency advantages such as sunk 
costs and timetable slots (for the incumbent) and entry costs 
(for a possible entrant). The deficiencies outlined in Fraser 
Feb 09 to the effect that there is no independent industry 
regulator and statutory framework for this industry means the 
industry is highly vulnerable to all the adverse effects that 
unregulated cherry picking and local private monopolies in 
essential services can entail.  
 
4.  Strategic behaviour on the part of bidders 
The implications of the Government's failures to adopt 
normal regulatory safeguards and to have a pre-defined 
qualified Operator of Last Resort contracted to take over 
(overnight, if necessary) in the event of the incumbent 
operator defaulting (or threatening to default) on the contract 
means that there is no real alternative but to continue with 
the tender once it is up and running. This will not be lost on 
future potential bidders for the network. 
 
CalMac will have to defend its right to run the network every 
six years and if it loses just once in the tendering process this 
will effectively eliminate it once and for all as an operator - or 
at least as an operator with the resources and capabilities 
necessary to run such a network.   
 
Bidders will be well aware of that, and also will be aware of 
the deficiencies regarding the absence of a pre-designated 
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Operator of Last Resort. There will be an incentive to under-
bid CalMac on the bidding process (and under EC law the 
least subsidy bid must be accepted) knowing that once 
control of the network is secured, the winning bidder will be 
able to renegotiate terms mid-contract.  They will know the 
government will have no alternative but to pay up or face the 
cessation of essential services to vulnerable island 
communities. History suggests that when the market is faced 
with such opportunities, the market will exploit them. 
 
There are other lessons from history as I noted in Fraser 
Commentary Feb 08 with respect to NorthLink. This 
company informed the Scottish Executive that it could no 
longer realistically deliver its contractual obligations to the 
Northern Isles over the four years remaining of the contract 
for ferry services. The Scottish Executive concluded 
Northlink was heading for insolvency and unless additional 
subsidy was paid, lifeline services could have been 
interrupted.  Significant additional subsidy of about £43mill 
was then paid.  
 
There is no suggestion that Northlink was behaving 
strategically and that its difficulties were anything other than 
real and not contrived. The important point was that the 
government had no alternative to pay up because of the 
situation that was of the government’s creation. These 
failures may not be limited to the Northlink contract in the 
future, yet these risks have been created and deemed 
acceptable by policy makers in the face of all that is accepted 
as good (and indeed necessary) practice in such contexts.   
 
5.  Gourock-Dunoon  
On 31 December, the Scottish Government issued a tender 
notice for the Gourock-Dunoon public service
8
. Presently the 
public service there runs a mixed vehicle and foot passenger 
service, vehicle-carrying in unsubsidized competition with 
Western Ferries, a commercial operator. The present 
subsidy for the public service is for the carriage of foot 
passengers only.  Although the new contract is for a 
subsidized service on a route classifiable as a public service 
route under EC guidelines, there is no maximum fare or 
minimum fare specified in the contract notice as would is 
permissible with PSOs, and operators are expected to supply 
their own vessels, unlike other CalMac routes where the 
government builds and supplies the vessels. Thus obviously 
precludes bidders opting to build their own vessels since the 
contracts will only be for six years, which means that they will 
have to find whatever is available on the second hand 
market.  This by definition is composed of vessels not 
explicitly designed for that route, and biased towards the 
obsolete and inefficient.   
 
The official report into the Gourock-Dunoon ferry market 
9
 
conducted by Deloitte Touche for the Scottish Executive 
confirmed that the most efficient and least subsidy method to 
provide for the subsidized foot passenger market was with 
combined vehicle and passenger vessels to help to offset the 
subsidy needed for the low revenue / high cost foot 
passenger market. However these vessels usually have to 
be designed and built specially, as is demonstrated in other 
CalMac routes in Scottish waters, so it is highly unlikely that 
the two modern vehicle-passenger vessels that the Delloite 
Touche report identified as needed for this route will be 
secured by any potential bidder for this tender. 
 
The importance of Gourock-Dunoon can be seen from the 
map (Figure 1). The Gourock-Dunoon ferries cover a short 
distance, for much the same reason (and serving much the 
same function) that the Forth Bridges provide over on the 
East Coast of Scotland, in transport terms and 
geographically these ferries are the mirror image of the Forth 
Bridges. The Gourock-Dunoon ferries are an essential and 
intrinsic part of the West Coast transport network with the 
road alternative involving an 84 mile detour.  
 
There is no guarantee as to what, if any, bids will be received 
for this new tender. The last tender for the service led to no 
bids at all and CalMac continuing with the public service by 
default, leading to accusations of the government having 
failed to abide by EC law.    
 
Given what appears to be (at best) a very thin second hand 
market for suitable vehicle-passenger ferries, it is entirely 
possible that the public service route will become passenger-
only, giving the private firm Western Ferries the status of sole 
operator of vehicle carrying traffic Gourock-Dunoon.  This in 
turn raises a range of problems and issues which policy-
makers have created, some of which are covered in the next 
section.   
     
6.  Reconciling private interests and public 
interests  
Normally the question of reconciling private commercial 
interests with the public interest when dealing with an 
industry providing an essential service is the job of an 
industry regulator in the context of a dedicated statutory 
framework with back up from a pre-specified Operator of Last 
Resort.  However, as we have noted, there are no such 
provisions in Scottish ferry policy.  
 
To consider some of the issues that this has raised, we shall 
consider possible indicative developments involving just one 
private company, Western Ferries and some of its publicly 
stated interests in other ferry routes. 
 
Pages 61-66 
First, Western Ferries have already stated that they are 
bidding for the Gourock-Dunoon public service, and as we 
have noted in the previous section even if they are 
unsuccessful this could still lead to the private firm being the 
sole operator of vehicle-carrying ferries Gourock-Dunoon.
10
 
 
Second, Western Ferries have also recently announced their 
intention to mount a commercial challenge to CalMac’s 
Addrossan-Brodick public service
11
, and in the opinion of 
Professor Alf Baird of Napier’s Transport Research Institute, 
competition between the two operators would be unlikely to 
be sustainable in the long run
12
, raising the possibility that 
the private operator could crowd out the vehicle-carrying 
public service operator on this route also.    
   
Third, Western Ferries have a long-standing and publicly 
stated interest in running a service from Bute to Ardyne Point 
on the Cowal Peninsula
13
, once the public road and 
associated infrastructure have been upgraded by the local 
council. This route lies between both the Colintraive-
Rhubodach and Rothesay-Wemyss Bay CalMac ferry routes 
from Bute (see figure 1), with Ardyne Point lying on the same 
peninsula as Colintraive. For most travelers, the route at 
Ardyne would be a direct substitute for the Colintraive ferry, 
which could well see a crowding out of that public service for 
much the same reason that the CalMac Arran service could 
be crowded out by Western Ferries.  
 
However, the Ardyne service when combined with Western 
Ferries Gourock-Dunoon service using the Cowal Peninsula 
as a land bridge could also prove an alternative to the 
Wemyss Bay / Rothesay service for many travelers from 
Bute to Inverclyde and Glasgow (less so for travellers from 
Bute to Ayrshire direction) . Since Western Ferries service 
would be a commercial service, this could lead to a repetition 
of complaints that Western have made in the case of 
Gourock-Dunoon that their commercial vehicle-carrying 
service was facing unfair competition from the subsidised 
CalMac service. That again could be seen as legitimising for 
Bute a repetition of what happened on Gourock-Dunoon 
where the public vehicle-carrying service was first restricted, 
and may now be terminated, as a consequence of measures 
taken by the government to insulate the Western Ferries 
service from competition from the public service.   
 
I would emphasise I am not commenting on the likelihood of 
any or all of this happening, this is just reporting Western 
Ferries publicly declared interests and possible plans, and 
their possible implications. Nor should this be seen as 
voicing any opinion on the economic costs and benefits of 
actual route options such as short crossings. And there are 
also other scenarios such as the possible extension of the 
government’s pilot RET (Road Equivalent Tariff) scheme into 
the Clyde routes that would affect these possibilities.  
However even the most likely and most immediate  scenario 
in which Western absorbed all of CalMac’s Gourock-Dunoon 
vehicular traffic would lead to an outcome in which the 
private operator on this one route would be carrying about 
two-thirds the volume of cars carried by what was left of the 
CalMac network.
14
   
 
The fundamental point of concern, of which Western’s plans 
are indicative, is the potential nature and scale of scenarios 
associated with such plans and possible outcomes. The four 
public service routes discussed here shown in Figure 1 
(Arran, the two Bute routes, and Gourock-Dunoon) carried 
451,000 cars in 2008, the rest of the CalMac network carried 
662,000 cars in the same year, while Western Ferries carried 
588,000 cars.
15 
 
An extreme scenario in which competition from Western 
Ferries leads to the company absorbing all the traffic from 
these four CalMac  routes would on the 2008 figures lead to 
Western Ferries  carrying 50% more car traffic than would  
left for the rump of the CalMac network.  In such a scenario a 
commercial firm would be sole operator for several routes 
classifiable under UK and EC rules as public service routes 
and so eligible for the imposition of PSOs such as maximum 
prices and minimum frequency.  But since this government 
and its predecessor have chosen not to make use of the 
tools that UK and EC law has given it, and set up a proper 
regulatory framework, it is questionable whether such 
measures would be implemented.  
 
In such circumstances, there is no suggestion here that 
Western Ferries and other potential commercial entrants 
would be doing anything other than pursuing legitimate 
shareholder interests under the existing law.  But as we 
teach in Economics 101, private interest is not always fully 
reconcilable with the public interest, especially where the 
provision of essential services by private local monopolies is 
concerned. The failures of successive administration to 
recognize and deal with that simple point are likely to be felt 
by vulnerable and fragile communities for generations to 
come.      
  
Conclusion 
The Commission Decision on alleged State aid to Scottish 
ferries has done nothing to mend structural fault lines running 
through policy-making in relation to public services provided 
on the Scottish ferry network. The Commission cannot be 
blamed for these failures which are not their responsibility, 
but the lack of willingness on the part of successive 
administrations to deal with these failures raises serious risks 
to the public interest, most especially for the taxpayer, the 
users, and the communities who depend on these essential 
services.   
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Addendum 
The present Scottish Administration has been carrying out a 
“Ferries Review” of policy in this area, the Review was 
originally ordered under the previous Labour/LibDem 
administration. As this Commentary was going to press, the 
Herald newspaper reported that a government memo made 
available to the newspaper indicated that the date of 
publication for the Review was “in reality” likely to be later 
than the latest date for the next Scottish parliamentary 
election due May 5, 2011 (CalMac review advises break-
up, Herald, 7th February 2010). In short, the present 
administration will simply have started a Review ordered by 
its predecessor, and then passed on to its successor any 
decisions about publication, and any decision or decisions as 
to what, if anything, should be done about the Review. If any 
further evidence were needed of the ostrich-like behaviour I 
describe in my article, this timely example would be difficult 
to surpass.  
 
____________________ 
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